TRANSAX: A Blockchain-based Decentralized Forward-Trading Energy Exchange for Transactive Microgrids

Aron Laszka
Computer Science
University of Houston
Houston, TX

Scott Eisele, Abhishek Dubey, Gabor Karsai
Institute for Software Integrated Systems
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN

Karla Kvaternik
Siemens Corporate Technology
Princeton, NJ

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Abstract—Power grids are undergoing major changes due to rapid growth in renewable energy and improvements in battery technology. Prompted by the increasing complexity of power systems, decentralized IoT solutions are emerging, which arrange local communities into transactive microgrids. The core functionality of these solutions is to provide mechanisms for matching producers with consumers while ensuring system safety. However, there are multiple challenges that these solutions still face: privacy, trust, and resilience. The privacy challenge arises because the time series of production and consumption data for each participant is sensitive and may be used to infer personal information. Trust is an issue because a producer or consumer can renge on the promised energy transfer. Providing resilience is challenging due to the possibility of failures in the infrastructure that is required to support these market based solutions. In this paper, we develop a rigorous solution for transactive microgrids that addresses all three challenges by providing an innovative combination of MILP solvers, smart contracts, and publish-subscribe middleware within a framework of a novel distributed application platform, called Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid. Towards this purpose, we describe the key architectural concepts, including fault tolerance, and show the trade-off between market efficiency and resource requirements.

Index Terms—smart grid, distributed ledger, decentralized application, transactive energy, system resilience, blockchain, smart contract, cyber-physical system

I. INTRODUCTION

Power grids are undergoing major changes due to the rapid adoption of renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar power [1], [2]. For example, 4,143 megawatts of solar panels were installed in the third quarter of 2016 [3]. This capacity is predicted to grow from 4% of the total global energy production in 2015 to 29% in 2040 [4]. Simultaneously, battery technology costs per kWh have been dropping significantly [5], reaching grid parity [6]. These trends are enabling a decentralized vision for the future of power-grid operations in which local peer-to-peer energy trading within microgrids can be used to reduce the load on distribution system operators (DSO), leading to the development of Transactive Energy Systems (TES) [7]–[10]. Such mechanisms can improve system reliability and efficiency by integrating inverter-based renewable resources into the grid and by supplying power to the local loads when the main grid is interrupted.

To accomplish the goal of transactive energy, individual prosumers\(^1\) need to engage in interactions, negotiate with each other, enter agreements, and make proactive run-time decisions—individually and collectively—while responding to changing demands and environmental conditions. In theory, these interactions could happen in a centralized manner by communicating relevant variables to a central controller, which would compute and broadcast the “optimal” control settings back to each individual prosumer. However, this system would not scale well as the number of coordinating parties increases. It would also adversely affect resilience because of increased risks for data corruption and loss during transmission. Further, the centralized controller would constitute a single point of failure. On the other hand, distributed optimization solutions might suffer from the same scalability challenges, and the “distribution” of the optimization problem often requires the over-simplification of objective functions, which would result in losing the guarantees of a globally “optimal” solution. In light of this, novel “decentralized” solutions are needed, in which individual prosumers operate with autonomous controllers that can trade on their behalf in a market, which is itself decentralized. However, creating such decentralized solutions is challenging due to a number of problems.

The first problem is ensuring the physical stability and safety of the grid apparatus, which requires dynamically balancing supply and demand without violating line capacity constraints. The second one is a distributed systems problem, which requires ensuring that this peer-to-peer market operates in a trustworthy manner even if some of the nodes are malicious, compromised, or faulty. The third problem

\(^1\)A prosumer is a home that can not only consume, but also produce surplus energy. Homes without production will be simply called consumers.
is related to privacy. While non-transactive smart metering systems require sharing prosumer information only with the DSO, transactive systems need to disseminate information among the participants to enable finding trade partners. The dissemination of trading information threatens the privacy of prosumers since it may expose their private information to anyone in the same microgrid. Further, data collected from energy transactions is expected to be more fine-grained than data collected by currently deployed smart meters [11], and it may be used to infer personal information about the market participants. For example, a participant’s presence or absence at their residence might be inferable from their energy future offers (e.g., if a prosumer posts an energy selling offer, the residents are less likely to be at home). The fourth problem is resilience. Failures in distributed computing systems are a fact, and hence the transactive system must be able to tolerate failures by either mitigating faults or adapting the system to a different configuration.

Contributions: In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of TRANSAX, a transactive decentralized platform built over a distributed middleware, called Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid (RIAPS) [12], [13]. RIAPS isolates the hardware details from the algorithms and provides essential mechanisms for resource management, fault tolerance, and security. An integrated distributed ledger and smart contracts provide us with the mechanisms to provide consensus and trust. This is in line with the recent trends in the research community and industry focused on transactive energy markets [14], [15]. Although disintermediation of trust is widely regarded as the primary feature of blockchain-based transaction systems [16], their use in TES is appealing also because they elegantly integrate the ability to immutably record the ownership and transfer of assets, with essential distributed computing services, such as Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus on the ledger state as well as event chronology. The ability to establish consensus on state and timing is important in the context of TES since these systems are envisioned to involve the participation of self-interested parties, interacting with one another via a distributed computing platform that executes transaction management. We provide privacy by using a mixing service, which prevents tracing assets being traded back to their owner, as described in our prior work [17]. However, unlike [17], we consider an automated matching system that maximizes the amount of energy traded within the local market, while satisfying safety constraints. Finally, we describe and evaluate an extension to the RIAPS framework that implements distributed fault detection and mitigation mechanisms. These mechanisms are critical for resilient operation of TRANSAX.

Outline: The outline of this paper is as follows. We explain the problem of transactive energy systems using an example in Section II. Then, we contextualize our contributions in TRANSAX using related research in Section III. We describe TRANSAX in Section IV, which is followed by an evaluation using a case study in Section V. Finally, we conclude with discussions in Section VI.

II. TRANSACTIVE ENERGY PROBLEM

Consider a microgrid with a set of feeders arranged in a radial topology. A feeder has a fixed set of nodes, each representing a residential load or a combination of load and distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop solar and batteries. Each node is associated with a participant in the local peer-to-peer energy trading market. There is a distribution system operator (DSO), that also participates in the market and may thus use the market to incentivize timed energy production within the microgrid to aid in grid stabilization and promotion of related ancillary services [18]. In addition, the DSO supplies residual demand not met through the local market. The participants settle trades in advance, which allows them to schedule their transfer of power into the local distribution system. Alternatively, a mechanism can be responsible for matching the producers and consumers. There are typically three phases in these operations: discovery of compatible offers, matching of buying offers to selling offers (which may have been submitted either by each prosumer individually or by automated matching mechanisms). Once the matching is done, the energy transactions and financial transactions are then handled at a later time.

Example 1: Consider a community with two prosumers (P₁, P₂) and one consumer (C₁) on a single feeder. To make the problem of matching energy offers tractable, let's assume that the offers are made and matched for discrete time intervals. These intervals quantize the whole day, and their length can be a parameter of the problem setup. For the sake of example, let's assume that each day is divided into 15 minute intervals. Let's assume that P₁ has the ability to transfer 10 kW into the feeder during interval 48, which translates to 12:00pm–12:15pm. Assume similarly that P₂ can also provide 30 kW to the feeder in interval 48, but it has battery storage. Since P₂ has battery—unlike P₁, who must either transfer the energy or send the energy into the group—P₂ can delay the transfer until a future interval, e.g., interval 49. Now suppose that C₁ needs to consume 30 kW in interval 48 and 10 kW in interval 49. All the prosumers and consumer must provide these requirements to the market mechanism, which will then provide a matching solution. A possible solution would be to provide all 30 kW to C₁ from P₂ in interval 48. However, that will lead to the waste of energy provided by P₁. Thus, a better solution will be to consume 10 kW from P₁ in interval 48 and 20 kW from P₂ in interval 48. Then, transfer 10 kW from P₂ in interval 49, which is more efficient than the first matching as it allows more energy (summed across the intervals) to be transferred.

2The methods developed in this paper are extensible to more general tree topologies involving branching. We work with a radial topology to simplify our notation.

3A feeder element in electrical distribution is a power line transferring power from a distribution substation to distribution transformers or from distribution transformers to the end homes.
Note that the second solution requires the market to consider future intervals while solving the problem, which increases the size of the optimization problem. Further, it should be noted that if the information about \( C_1 \)'s offer is made public, then one can estimate that \( C_1 \) was doing heavy machine work during interval 48 and there was substantially lower activity during interval 49.

Based on this example, it is clear that there are five basic requirement that must be met by any solution.

- The first requirement is the existence of an appropriate communication and messaging architecture. The decentralized platform must collect participants’ offers and make them available to buyers and sellers, and the market algorithm must communicate clearing prices and buyer-seller matchings. These messages must be reliably delivered under strict timing constraints, derived from the deadline by which a trade must clear.
- The trading activity shall not compromise the stability of the physical system operation. For example, capacity constraints along any feeder should be respected. Specifically, each feeder is rated for a maximal power capacity. For example, if the feeder capacity is only 10 kW, then \( C_1 \) should not consume 30 kW.
- There are a number of parameters of the system that should be made configurable. For example, the number of intervals to look ahead while solving the matching problem is one such parameter. Another parameter is the prediction window for each prosumer. Note that Example 1 required that the prosumers make their offers for future intervals available.
- Information such as the amount of energy produced, consumed, bought, or sold by any prosumer should be available only to the Distribution System Operator. All bids and asks as well as the matching thereof should remain anonymous to the other participants.
- The failure of a prosumer or market agent, including any solvers that are required to search for a matching solution, must not compromise the system. Further, there should be mechanisms to ensure that everyone agrees to and conforms to the decisions made by the market mechanism.

III. RELATED WORK

Implementing a Transaction Management Platforms (TMP) requires a communication architecture, as well as trading mechanisms that provide the capability to match the bids and asks. Blockchain-based solutions have the potential to enable large-scale energy trading based on distributed consensus systems. However, popular blockchain solutions, such as Bitcoin [19] and Ethereum [20], suffer from design limitations that prevent their direct application to validating energy trades.

For example, Aitzhan and Svetinovic implemented a proof-of-concept platform for decentralized smart-grid energy trading using blockchains, but their system is based on proof-of-work consensus, and they do not consider grid control and stability, or scalability [21]. Additionally, there is still the problem of privacy—all transactions in these systems are public [22].

Most works discussing privacy look at it from the context of smart meters. McDaniel and McLaughlin discuss privacy concerns due to energy-usage profiling, which smart grids could potentially enable [23]. Eftymiou and Kalogridis describe a method for securely anonymizing frequent electrical metering data sent by a smart meter by using a third party escrow mechanism [24]. Tan et al. study privacy in a smart metering system from an information theoretic perspective in the presence of energy harvesting and storage units [25]. They show that energy harvesting provides increased privacy by diversifying the energy source, while a storage device can be used to increase both energy efficiency and privacy. However, transaction data from energy trading may provide more fine-grained information than smart meter based usage patterns [11].

Existing energy trading markets, such as the European Energy Exchange [26] and project NOBEL in Spain, employ the double-auction market mechanism [27], which can be implemented to preserve participant privacy. However, typical exchange implementations involve centralized database architectures which constitute single points of failure.

Majumder et al. present an iterative double auction trading mechanism that preserves the participants’ privacy, in particular, it keeps their utility functions private [28]. Similarly, Faqiry and Das present an auction mechanism for maximizing social welfare of buyers and sellers (if the supply is small) [29]. Their approach also provides some privacy meaning that participants do not reveal their utility functions. By constricting the buyers’ utility functions to be convex, the social welfare objective function is maximized when the micro-grid controller objective function, whose goal is to maximize the power sold, is maximized. In the later part of the paper, they consider an approach that discards the privacy maintained during the first phase in order to make trading fair. In their work, there is no mechanism to check whether the buyer can produce the power they claim they can supply, which could result in instability. The authors also mention in passing that their approach can be implemented as a distributed algorithm, but this was not carried out.

In contrast, the work presented in this paper is a distributed systems mechanism that considers the problem of a broader definition of privacy, safety, and protection from malicious actors as a combined problem.

IV. TRANSAX PLATFORM

Next, we describe the solution implemented by the TRANSAX platform. Figure 1 describes the components of this decentralized and distributed platform. An agent runs on a computing node within the premises of each home. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to these agents as “prosumers” or “consumers” depending upon the context, but they are implemented as one type of entity that can both buy and sell energy. The solvers are nodes responsible for identifying the feasible and optimal trades. The miners are
The landscape of a Transactive Energy Systems with TRANSAX. TSO/ISO are responsible for bulk trading. Multiple instances of smaller scale trading platforms can co-exist at distribution and microgrid level.

First, we describe the market problem and then describe a smart contract solution and a protocol to setup the distributed system. Finally, we describe the distributed architecture of the implementation of the system.

### A. Market Problem

Let $\mathcal{F}$ denote the set of feeders. For a feeder $f \in \mathcal{F}$, we let $C_{f}^{\text{ext}}$ denote the maximum amount of power that is allowed to flow into or out of the feeder at any point in time. Similarly, we let $C_{f}^{\text{int}}$ denote the maximum amount of power that is allowed to be consumed or produced within the feeder at any point in time. We assume that time is divided into intervals of fixed length $\Delta$, and we refer to the $t$-th interval simply as time interval $t$. For a list of symbols used in the paper, see Table I.

The input of the energy trading problem is the set of buying and selling offers posted by the participants. For feeder $f \in \mathcal{F}$, we let $\mathcal{S}_{f}$ and $\mathcal{B}_{f}$ denote the set of selling and buying offers posted by participants located in that feeder, respectively. A selling offer $s \in \mathcal{S}$ is a tuple $(E_{s}, I_{s}, R_{s})$, where

- $E_{s}$ is the amount of energy to be sold,
- $I_{s}$ is the set of time intervals in which the energy could be provided,
- $R_{s}$ is the reservation price, i.e., lowest unit price for which the participant is willing to sell energy.

Similarly, a buying offer $b \in \mathcal{B}$ is a tuple $(E_{b}, I_{b}, R_{b})$, where the values pertain to consuming/buying energy instead of producing/selling, and $R_{b}$ is the highest price that the participant is willing to pay. For convenience, we also let $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ denote the set of all buying and selling offers (i.e., we set $\mathcal{S} = \bigcup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \mathcal{S}_{f}$ and $\mathcal{B} = \bigcup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \mathcal{B}_{f}$).

We say that a pair of selling and buying offers $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and $b \in \mathcal{B}$ is matchable if

$$ R_{s} \leq R_{b} \quad \text{and} \quad I_{s} \cap I_{b} \neq \emptyset. \quad (1) $$

In other words, a pair of offers is matchable if there exists a price at which both participants would accept and a time interval in which the seller and buyer could provide and consume energy. For a given selling offer $s \in \mathcal{S}$, we let the set of buying offers that are matchable with $s$ be denoted by $\mathcal{M}(s)$. Similarly, we let the set of selling offers that are matchable with a buying offer $b$ be denoted by $\mathcal{M}(b)$. Further, we let $I(s, b) = I_s \cap I_b$.

\[\begin{array}{|l|l|}
\hline
\text{Symbol} & \text{Description} \\
\hline
\mathcal{F} & \text{set of feeders} \\
C_{f}^{\text{ext}} & \text{maximum net power consumption or net power production in feeder } f \in \mathcal{F} \\
C_{f}^{\text{int}} & \text{maximum total power consumption or total power production in feeder } f \in \mathcal{F} \\
\Delta & \text{length of time intervals} \\
T_{\text{clear}} & \text{minimum number of time intervals between the finalization and delivery of a trade} \\
\hline
\mathcal{S}_{f} & \text{set of selling offers from feeder } f \in \mathcal{F} \\
\mathcal{B}_{f} & \text{set of buying offers from feeder } f \in \mathcal{F} \\
\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{B} & \text{set of all selling and buying offers, resp.} \\
\mathcal{S}^{(i)}, \mathcal{B}^{(i)} & \text{set of selling and buying offers submitted by the end of time interval } t, \text{ resp.} \\
E_{s}, E_{b} & \text{amount of energy to be sold or bought by offers } s \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } b \in \mathcal{B}, \text{ resp.} \\
I_{s}, I_{b} & \text{time intervals in which energy could be provided or consumed by offers } s \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } b \in \mathcal{B}, \text{ resp.} \\
R_{s}, R_{b} & \text{reservation prices of offers } s \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } b \in \mathcal{B}, \text{ resp.} \\
\mathcal{M}(s), \mathcal{M}(b) & \text{set of offers that are matchable with offers } s \text{ and } b, \text{ resp.} \\
I(s, b) & \text{interval of length } \Delta \text{ during which energy transfer should take place.} \\
\hline
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{|l|l|}
\hline
\text{Implementation Parameters} & \\
\hline
T_{\text{predict}} & \text{prediction window used by prosumers when posting selling and buying offers} \\
T_{\text{lookahead}} & \text{number of time intervals considered in the future by the solver} \\
\Delta & \text{length of the time step used for simulating the real-time interval of length } \Delta \\
\hline
\end{array}\]
A solution to the energy trading problem is a pair of vectors $(p, \pi)$, where

- $p_{s,b,t}$ is a non-negative amount of power that should be provided by the seller $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and consumed by the buyer $b \in \mathcal{M}(s)$ in time interval $t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)$.
- $\pi_{s,b,t}$ is the unit price for the energy provided by seller $s \in \mathcal{S}$ to buyer $b \in \mathcal{M}(s)$ in time interval $t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)$.

A pair of vectors $(p, \pi)$ is a feasible solution to the energy trading problem if it satisfies the following constraints:

- The amount of energy sold or bought from each offer is at most the amount of energy offered:
  \[
  \forall s \in \mathcal{S} : \sum_{b \in \mathcal{M}(s)} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)} p_{s,b,t} \cdot \Delta \leq E_s \tag{2}
  \]
  \[
  \forall b \in \mathcal{B} : \sum_{s \in \mathcal{M}(b)} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)} p_{s,b,t} \cdot \Delta \leq E_b \tag{3}
  \]
- The amount of power flowing into or out of each feeder is below the safety limit in all time intervals:
  \[
  \forall f \in \mathcal{F}, t : \left( \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}_f} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_f} p_{s,b,t} \right) - \left( \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_f} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} p_{s,b,t} \right) \leq C_{f}^{\text{ext}} \tag{4}
  \]
  \[
  \forall f \in \mathcal{F}, t : \left( \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}_f} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_f} p_{s,b,t} \right) - \left( \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_f} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} p_{s,b,t} \right) \geq -C_{f}^{\text{ext}} \tag{5}
  \]
- The amount of energy consumed and produced within each feeder is below the safety limit in all time intervals:
  \[
  \forall f \in \mathcal{F}, t : \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_f} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} p_{s,b,t} \leq C_{f}^{\text{int}} \tag{6}
  \]
  \[
  \forall f \in \mathcal{F}, t : \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}_f} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}_f} p_{s,b,t} \leq C_{f}^{\text{int}} \tag{7}
  \]
- The unit prices are between the reservation prices of the seller and buyer:
  \[
  \forall s \in \mathcal{S}, b \in \mathcal{M}(s), t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b) : R_s \leq \pi_{s,b,t} \leq R_b \tag{8}
  \]

The objective of the energy trading problem is to maximize the amount of energy traded. Formally, an optimal solution to the energy trading problem is

\[
\max_{(p, \pi) \in \text{Feasible}(S,B)} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{M}(s)} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)} p_{s,b,t}, \tag{9}
\]

where $\text{Feasible}(S,B)$ is the set of feasible solutions given selling and buying offers $S$ and $B$ (i.e., set of solutions satisfying Equations (2) to (8) with $S$ and $B$).

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\(^8\)We require the both the seller and buyer to produce a constant level of power during the time interval.

1) **Linear-Programming Solution:** We can solve the basic energy trading problem efficiently by formulating it as a linear program. First, create real-valued variables $p_{s,b,t}$ and $\pi_{s,b,t}$ for each $s \in \mathcal{S}, b \in \mathcal{M}(s), t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)$. Then, the following reformulation of the matching problem is a linear program:

\[
\max_{p,\pi} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{M}(s)} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)} p_{s,b,t} \tag{10}
\]

subject to Equations (2) to (8) and

\[
p \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \pi \geq 0. \tag{11}
\]

2) **Trade Finalization:** Equation (9) formulates the problem considering a single “snapshot” of all offers across all time intervals. However, in practice, prosumers may submit new offers at any time, resulting in continuously evolving sets of offers. Consequently, optimal solutions to Equation (9) may have to be found repeatedly as new offers are submitted, resulting in a series of evolving solutions. This presents a problem since prosumers need to know in advance what the “final” solution for a certain time interval is in order to be able to actually schedule energy production or consumption for that interval. Further, preventing “last-minute” changes can be crucial for safety and stability since it allows the DSO to prepare for satisfying energy demand that cannot be met locally.

As the set of submitted offers grows, the optimal solution to the energy trading problem may change, and the optimal value of each $p_{s,b,t}$ may vary. While each change can increase the amount of energy traded, the trade values $p_{s,b,t}$ and $\pi_{s,b,t}$ need to be finalized at some point in time. At the very latest, values for interval $t$ need to be finalized by the end of interval $t - 1$; otherwise, participants would have no chance of actually delivering the trade. We now extend the energy trading problem to consider a growing set of offers and a time constraint for finalizing trades. Our approach finalizes a minimum set of trades in each interval, which maximizes efficiency while providing safety.

We assume that all trades for time interval $t$ (i.e., all values $p_{s,b,t}$ and $\pi_{s,b,t}$) must be finalized by the end of time interval $t - T_{\text{clear}}$, where $T_{\text{clear}}$ is a positive integer constant, which is set by the operator. In practice, the value of $T_{\text{clear}}$ must be chosen taking into account both physical constraints (e.g., how long it takes to turn on a generator) and communication delay (e.g., some participants might learn of a trade with delay due to network disruptions).

We let $\tilde{p}_{s,b,t}$ and $\tilde{\pi}_{s,b,t}$ denote the finalized trade values, and we let $\mathcal{B}^{(i)}$ and $\mathcal{S}^{(i)}$ denote the set of buying and selling offers that participants have submitted by the end of time interval $t$. Then, the system takes the following steps at the end of each time interval $t$:

- Find an optimal solution $(\tilde{p}^*, \pi^*)$ to the extended energy trading problem:

\[
\max_{(p,\pi) \in \text{Feasible}(\mathcal{S}^{(i)},\mathcal{B}^{(i)})} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}^{(i)}} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{M}(s)} \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{I}(s,b)} p_{s,b,\tau} \tag{12}
\]
subject to
\[
\forall \tau < t + T_{\text{clear}}: \quad p_{s,b,\tau} = \hat{p}_{s,b,\tau} \quad (13)
\]
\[
\pi_{s,b,\tau} = \hat{\pi}_{s,b,\tau} \quad (14)
\]

- Finalize trade values for time interval \( t + T_{\text{clear}} \) based on the optimal solution \((p^*, \pi^*)\):
\[
\hat{p}_{s,b,t+T_{\text{clear}}} := p^*_{s,b,t+T_{\text{clear}}} \quad (15)
\]
\[
\hat{\pi}_{s,b,t+T_{\text{clear}}} := \pi^*_{s,b,t+T_{\text{clear}}} \quad (16)
\]

The problem in Equation (12) can also be reformulated as a linear program similarly, by considering \( S^{(i)}, B^{(i)}, \hat{p}, \hat{\pi} \), and the additional constraints.

### B. Market Solver

The role of the market solver is to periodically solve the linear program mentioned above as the offers stream in. To address the trustworthiness challenge, we implement a blockchain-based solution as discussed previously. However, since computation is relatively expensive on blockchain-based distributed platforms, solving the energy trading problem using a blockchain-based smart contract would not be scalable in practice. In light of this, we adopt a hybrid implementation approach, which we introduced in earlier [30], to transactive energy systems. The hybrid approach combines the trustworthiness of blockchain-based smart contracts with the efficiency of more traditional computational platforms. The key idea of our hybrid approach is to (1) use a high-performance computer to solve the computationally expensive linear program off-chain\(^9\) and then (2) use a smart contract to record the solution on the blockchain.

1) Blockchain-based Smart Contract: We implemented a smart contract\(^{10}\) that verifies the feasibility of each solution \((p, \pi)\) submitted by an off-chain solver. If the solution is feasible, then the contract computes the value of the objective function and compares it to the objective value of previously submitted solutions. The contract always keeps track of the best feasible solution submitted so far, which we call the candidate solution. At the end of each time interval \( t \), the contract finalizes the trade values for interval \( t + T_{\text{clear}} \) based on the candidate solution.\(^{11}\)

This simple functionality achieves a high level of security and reliability. Firstly, it is clear that an adversary cannot force the contract to finalize trades based on an unsafe (i.e., infeasible) solution since such a solution would be rejected. Similarly, an adversary cannot force the contract to choose an inferior solution instead of a superior one. In sum, the only action available to the adversary is proposing a superior feasible solution, which would actually improve energy trading in the microgrid.

The contract is also reliable and can tolerate temporary disruptions in the solver or the communication network. Notice that any solution \((p, \pi)\) that is feasible for sets \( S \) and \( B \) is also feasible for supersets \( S' \supseteq S \) and \( B' \supseteq B \). As the sets of offers can only grow over time, the contract can use a candidate solution submitted during time interval \( t \) to finalize trades in any subsequent time interval \( \tau > t \). In fact, without receiving new solutions, the difference between the amount of finalized trades and the optimum will increase only gradually: since the earlier candidate solution can specify trades for any future time interval, the difference is only due to the offers that have been posted since the solution was found and submitted.

2) Solver: We complement the smart contract with an efficient linear programming solver, which can be run off-chain, on any capable computer (or multiple computers for reliability). The solver is run periodically to find a solution to the energy trading problem based on the latest set of offers posted. Once a solution is found by the solver, it is submitted to the smart contract in a blockchain transaction. Note that if new offers have been posted since the solver started working on the solution, the contract will still consider the solution to be feasible. This is again due to any feasible solution for sets \( S \) and \( B \) also being feasible for supersets \( S' \supseteq S \) and \( B' \supseteq B \).

From the perspective of the solver, being able to submit multiple solutions to the contract for the same problem has many advantages. For example, it allows the linear programming solver to be run as an anytime algorithm. Further, we can allow multiple—potentially untrusted—entities to try to solve the problem and submit solutions, since the smart contract will always choose the best feasible one. This is especially important in microgrids where a trusted third party is not guaranteed to always be present. In such settings, prosumers can be allowed to volunteer and provide solutions to the energy trading problem.\(^{12}\) Thereby, we enable finding solutions in an efficient and very flexible manner, while reaping the benefits of smart contracts, such as auditability and trustworthiness.

3) Solver Lookahead Window: Since the energy trading problem (i.e., Equation (12)) can be formulated as a linear program, we can solve it efficiently, that is, in polynomial time. However, as the number of offers and the time intervals that they span increases, the number of variables \( \{p_{s,b,t}\} \) may grow prohibitively high, which makes solving the trading problem very challenging in practice. A key observation that helps us tackle this challenge is that even though consumers and prosumers may post offers whose latest intervals are in the far future (i.e., for an offer \( s \), the latest interval may be \( \max I_s \gg t \), where \( t \) is the current interval), a solver only needs to consider a few intervals ahead of the finalization deadline. Indeed, we have observed that considering intervals in the far future has little effect on the optimal solution for the interval that is to be finalized next.

\(^{9}\)We use CPLEX [31] as the MILP solver engine in TRANSAX.

\(^{10}\)Source code is available upon request.

\(^{11}\)If no solution has been submitted to the contract so far, which might be the case right after the trading system has been launched, \( p = 0 \) may be used as a candidate solution.

\(^{12}\)Of course, each prosumer will try to submit a solution that favors the prosumer. However, the submitted solution still needs to be superior with respect to the optimization objective, which roughly corresponds to social utility. Hence, each prosumer is incentivized to improve social utility by submitting a superior solution that favors the prosumer. We leave the analysis of these incentives for future work.
Consequently, for practical solvers, we introduce a lookahead window $T_{\text{lookahead}} \geq T_{\text{clear}}$ that limits the intervals that need to be considered effectively; for any $t > t + T_{\text{lookahead}}$, we set $p_{a,b,i} = 0$, where $t$ is the current interval. By “pruning” the set of fee variables, we can significantly improve the performance of the solver with negligible effect on solution quality. Figure 3 shows the memory usage of the solver (in time interval $t = 80$) and the energy traded, while varying the lookahead-window length $T_{\text{lookahead}}$.

Similar to memory, the lookahead parameter also impacts the CPU utilization of the solver. Thus, as a practical matter, we implemented a hierarchical controller to automatically adjust the lookahead window in TRANSAX solvers using resource limit callbacks, which we will describe in Section IV-D. The top-level controller sets the maximum lookahead value based on the available memory. The low-level controller sets the lookahead to a value between $T_{\text{clear}}$ and the upper bound. The asynchronous architecture of TRANSAX enables multiple solvers to operate simultaneously and compete in providing a better matching solution, while obeying the limits imposed by available resources. This ensures that the solvers can be run on edge computing nodes in a community where other applications might also be co-hosted.

4) Other Parameters: In addition to the lookahead window $T_{\text{lookahead}}$, our implementation can also be configured with parameters that control the prosumers and the speed of the simulation. The solver operates as a periodic process, waiting on information from the smart contract about all the offers that have been posted. In our implementation, the prosumers also operate periodically, submitting their offers and bids to the smart contract in every interval. In a given interval, our prosumer implementation provides offers for up to $T_{\text{predict}}$ intervals in the future (including the current interval), where $T_{\text{predict}}$ is a parameter of the prosumer. We require that $T_{\text{predict}} > 1$ because we need at least one interval prediction for trading energy futures. Finally, during our experiments, we may speed up the simulation by letting the real-time length of the time interval be $\Delta < \Delta_s$, but keeping the theoretical length of the interval at $\Delta$. Note that $\Delta$ is the amount of real time passed in the simulation before proceeding to the next interval. This allows us to speed up the experiments without compromising our results since running the system slower would be easier.

C. TRANSAX Protocol

As illustrated in Figure 2, when a participant (i.e., prosumer, consumer, or solver) receives the address of the smart contract, they submit a transaction to register themselves in the blockchain. After some time, the transaction is mined and triggers an event (e.g., ProsumerRegistered) notifying the participant that it can begin posting offers. When the participants contact the DSO, the response contains time information allowing the participants to determine the earliest interval for which the blockchain is accepting bids and solutions. Any bid or solutions that contains an end time after that interval is ignored. The interval returned by the DSO is some number of intervals ahead of the current interval of the microgrid, since the power schedule must be determined before the time of actuation. The length of an interval in the case studies described here is 1 minute. For live deployments, the value can be configured by the system integrator. At the start of each interval, prosumers submit relevant bids to the blockchain. After trades have been added to the blockchain, the solver receives the OfferPosted event and will attempt to find a valid matching between bids and requests. The solver has a solving interval and attempts to find a better solution during each one. This continues until the DSO submits a finalize transaction to the blockchain, which triggers a TradeFinalized event. This event causes the solver to update its interval and begin working to find a solution for the next interval. The prosumers also receive this event informing them of the power they are expected to produce/consume during that interval when it arrives. Two concepts explained below are critical to this protocol

1) Offers: The middleware platform on which TRANSAX is build (described in next section) solves the problem of time synchronization, enabling all agents to correctly know the current interval and current time. Thus, the solvers and prosumers do not need to synchronize independently and can keep track of offers and intervals. The distributed
ledger acts as a shared database and provides a notification log of events (e.g., submission of a new offer). In TRANSAX, these offers are sent as a structure of the following form \{PROSUMER ID, START INTERVAL, END INTERVAL, ENERGY QUANTITY\}. Agents and solvers listen for these events and perform actions based on them.

2) Trade Finalization: Finalization of an interval means that the smart contract will not accept any more changes to the solution for that interval. Prosumers are notified of finalized trades using TradeFinalized events, which communicate matches as structures of the following form \{BUY OFFER ID, SELL OFFER ID, INTERVAL, POWER\}. This enables prosumers to act according to the solution of the energy trading problem since they know the identifiers of their offers and can filter on finalized trades. Note that even though we do not discuss penalizing prosumers who do not conform to the solution, it is straightforward to do this since the DSO can associate prosumers with their anonymous identifiers, and all offers and trades are permanently recorded on the ledger. Finally, the DSO can combine the recorded trades with actual power consumption and production values measured by electricity meters in order to bill prosumers (e.g., every month).

D. TRANSAX Implementation and Resilience

TRANSAX is implemented as an application in the Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid (RIAPS) [13]. A RIAPS system is a collection of computing nodes, which are connected to power system sensors and actuators over a variety of interfaces, e.g. Modbus/UART, etc. Each RIAPS computing node executes a collection of platform services which run with the highest privileges on the system. These services are for discovering the other components in the distributed system (riaps_disco), for remotely deploying application (riaps_deploy) and for providing the computing nodes with a synchronized time [32], which is critical for the correct operation of TRANSAX. Control nodes are responsible for installing and removing distributed applications on these nodes. Each RIAPS application is a collection of actors, which are assembled from reusable components.

1) Fault Model: We extended RIAPS with additional capabilities to monitor and mitigate failures across three layers: physical and device level, platform services level, and application level. Typically, physical electrical-system architectures are designed with $N-1$ criterion, i.e., they have redundancy to tolerate the failure of any single physical device. Fault management at services level is implemented by the combination of a distributed hash table, which maintains information about all actors, and Zero MQ Zyre [33], an open-source framework for proximity-based peer-to-peer applications. Further, we extended RIAPS to provide resource management. These features are important to ensure that TRANSAX actors can work on remote nodes within the limits of available resources. These limits are enforced via the use of the cgroups interface, watchdogs, and custom zeroMQ pair connections in RIAPS. To support application-specific failure mitigation, RIAPS provides callbacks (see Table II), which can be implemented by the component developers, in this case the TRANSAX components. For example, we used the handleCPULimit to implement the controller for the lookahead window described in Section IV-B3.

2) Mining Considerations: In the current implementation of TRANSAX, we use a private Ethereum network as the distributed ledger. To speed up the consensus protocol, we reduce the difficulty of the cryptographic puzzle solved for proof-of-work consensus. For larger systems, the proof-of-work consensus may be replaced by, e.g., proof-of-stake, for scalability.

V. Case Study

We consider a collection of load traces recorded from a microgrid in Germany, containing 102 homes (5 producers, 97 consumers) across 11 feeders. We show the nominal execution of the system as well as its resilience capabilities by illustrating execution under resource constraints and actor failures.

1) Nominal Evaluation: At this scale (102 prosumers), the current implementation was able to match offers during each simulation interval with $T_{lookahead} = 5$. The system-wide trading results can be seen in Figure 4. Each bar is a 15 minute interval. A green bar is the sum of all energy buying offers during that interval. A red bar is the sum of all energy selling offers during that interval. The blue bars are overlayed on the green bars, showing the total energy traded during that interval. Early in the simulation, the buying offers exceed the selling offers. Then, as solar generation increases, the selling offers exceed the buying offers. The excess may be stored in batteries for use in future intervals, which increases the complexity of
the MILP problem since offers can be matched across multiple intervals. Figure 5 shows evidence of this fact as we see an increase in solver time when selling offers exceed buying offers, around 11:00am. The increasing solver time is the result of increasing problem complexity, which is correlated with the number of variables and constraints in a problem. Some intervals and the corresponding numbers of variables and solve times are shown in Table III. Again, we see that as the selling offers exceed the buying offers, complexity increases, which results in increased solve time. These results provide insight into how the solver scales.

The scalability of TRANSAX is limited by the number of transactions that the distributed ledger supports, as well as the complexity of the MILP problem determined by the number of constraints and variables. Additionally, TRANSAX is able to scale by reducing the number of intervals and the corresponding numbers of variables and solve times shown in Table III. Again, we see that as the selling offers exceed the buying offers, complexity increases, which results in increased solve time. These results provide insight into how the solver scales.

The number of trades that are made in a day depends on the system parameters. In two experiments, we modulated the power flow constraints \( C_{ext} \) and \( C_{int} \). The result of this can be seen in Table IV. In both cases, the total buying and selling offers remained constant, only the amount of power that was permitted to flow was changed. Changing the constraints increased the power traded by 1.4MW, thus reducing unused energy by 31%. In light of this, the efficiency of the platform is primarily dependent on the offers that prosumers make and the system constraints.

2) Resource Limit Evaluation: In this section, we show resource-limit monitoring and mitigation for disk usage and CPU usage. In Figure 6, we set the disk storage limit for the prosumer to 50 MB. When the limit is reached, \( handleSpcLimit \) is triggered (see Table II), which forces the prosumer to rotate the logs.

To show the effect of the CPU resource constraint, we refer back to Section IV-B3. The actions of the top-level controller can be seen in Figure 7 as the yellow dots. When the solver consumes more than 30% \(^{13}\) of the CPU, the top-level controller reduces the maximum value that the low-level controller may set. We see that over time, the maximum value decreases and the lookahead value (green dots) stays below the maximum. The low-level controller sets the value of the lookahead window, and its influence is shown by the green dots. The low-level controller is implemented as a proportional controller which monitors the solve time and has a solve-time set point of 0.5 seconds. This value was chosen for testing purposes only. The memory controller (not pictured) uses the same high-level control (when the threshold is crossed, it reduces the upper bound) and the same low-level control.

Figure 3 demonstrates how TRANSAX can adapt to variation in the problem complexity. It shows the trade-off between resource consumption (memory) and trading efficiency during interval 80 (8:00pm) as the lookahead window varies. Trading efficiency stops increasing with a lookahead of 30, since interval 50 (12:30pm) is when selling offers become larger than buying offers, and thus the interval in which prediction becomes beneficial.

3) Failure Evaluation: Since TRANSAX is decentralized, there may be any number of solvers communicating asynchronously with the smart contract, being notified of trades and posting potential solutions. Thus, if any given solver fails, the system will continue unimpeded as long as other solvers are operational. The event \( handlePeerStateChange \) has been implemented in the platform, and it is triggered when a node in the network fails or if it is disconnected for any reason. All the peers in the network may receive this message and take corrective actions.

\(^{13}\) These instances can be seen in the \% CPU Utilization plot of Figure 7.
case, if a node goes down, it may be unable to provide the energy it was supposed to, and so its trades should be removed. During the testing of the fault-tolerance features, node failure was detected on average in 0.14 seconds. The peers (other actors in the TRANSAX application) were notified that the node has recovered 1.88 seconds after the failure, and the node was able to fully re.activate in 6.52 seconds on average.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

We described a decentralized platform for implementing energy exchange mechanisms in a microgrid setting. Our solution enables prosumers to trade energy without threatening their privacy or the safety of the system. Our hybrid solver approach, which combines a smart-contract based validator with an external optimizer, enables the platform to clear offers securely and efficiently.

In addition to the assurances provided by the distributed ledger, the resilience features provide necessary robustness for TRANSAX. For example, handleDeadline can be used to adjust T lookahead in order to adapt to varying complexity when there are strict timing requirements, and handlePeerStateChange can be used to monitor the health of neighboring prosumers, and if they become disconnected, their trades can be removed from the smart contract.

REFERENCES


